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ABSTRACT Children’s vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and deter-
mines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, chil-
dren’s general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they
have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of
legitimate authority over them. Second, children’s vulnerability to the loss of some special
goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is in
the so-far little-discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical
pursuits and experimentation with one’s self. I call these ‘special goods of childhood’ because
individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a dis-
tinctive and weighty contribution to wellbeing. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice
towards children. The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part
of every child’s upbringing.
Introduction
This article brings together two different issues in just childrearing, shows that they
are related, and argues that they have a common solution. Both have been receiving
increasing philosophical attention, but have so far been treated separately. The ﬁrst
problem is that children’s dependence on some adult’s care makes them generally vul-
nerable to abuses of power. Building on previous work,1 I argue that children’s general
vulnerability entails that they have a moral right to not be subjected to monopolies of
care, meaning that they have a moral right to receive care from more than one source
– ‘one source’ being one adult or group of adults whose interests are closely inter-
twined. This is a claim about the structure of legitimate authority over children, and it
states that authority ought to be divided between several authority holders. The gen-
eral form of the argument is:
1. Monopolies of care are, pro tanto, illegitimate.
2. Current child-rearing practices give parents a monopoly of care over children.
3. Parents’ monopoly of care cannot be justiﬁed by appeal to the children’s interests.
4. Therefore legitimate authority over children must avoid monopolies of care.
5. The best way to avoid monopolies of care in current societies is to supplement
parental care with good institutional care.
The second problem is generated by the fact that children are vulnerable to adults
not only for the provision of goods that are generally necessary for ﬂourishing – like
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food or safety – but also for the provision of the so-called intrinsic, or special, goods
of childhood. Children are able to derive great value from certain goods that can be
enjoyed either exclusively or mainly during childhood. These goods make a distinctive
and weighty contribution to the quality of children’s lives and, it has been argued, are
part of the metric of justice towards children.2 Children’s vulnerability to the loss of
these goods partly determines the content of legitimate authority over children. The
general form of the argument is:
6. Children are owed adequate access to the special goods of childhood.
7. Therefore the exercise of legitimate authority over children must give children
adequate access to these goods.
8. The best way to give all children adequate access to these goods in current
societies is in good institutional settings.
The common conclusion of the arguments is that:
9. We ought to make good institutional care part of every child’s upbringing.
I discuss each argument in the next two sections.
Objectionable Dependency and the Structure of Legitimate Authority Over
Children
Children are incapable of defending their own interests. To survive and thrive, they
unavoidably depend on, and therefore are vulnerable to, adults for the satisfaction of
many needs: some material, some emotional3 and intellectual, and some having to do
with children’s development into autonomous individuals able to make authoritative
decisions about their lives.4 Because they lack full autonomy, children are justiﬁably
subject to paternalism – adults have a moral right to exercise authority over them.
Moreover, adults also have a duty to exercise authority over children since children’s
ﬂourishing depends on paternalistic adult behaviour. But children’s pervasive vulnera-
bility means that authority over them must be exercised in ways that best protect their
morally weighty interests.5
Some believe that children’s dependency and hence vulnerability are in themselves
regrettable.6 However, children’s dependency makes possible the unique intimacy and
wholehearted love between children and their rearers. Children’s dependency includes
their interest in continuity in care and in close knowledge of their needs; hence, loving
a child well requires from the rearer a long-term commitment to be part of the rela-
tionship and an unusually high level of attention to the child’s need. These features of
good parental love are, in turn, likely to make it unusually deep and robust. This may
render children’s vulnerability valuable all things considered. Yet, the current level of
dependency is not necessary for preserving intimacy and wholehearted love in chil-
drearing. Because children’s dependency involves signiﬁcant risks7 we ought to min-
imise dependency as far as it is compatible with ensuring that children’s interests are
met. Children’s enjoyment of some non-parental caring relationships need not erode
the love and intimacy between children and parents – as we know from numerous
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cases when children have been lucky to have enduring close relationships with adults
other than their parents.
Robert Goodin’s account of objectionable dependency8 is particularly helpful for
explaining why justice requires a radical change in the way in which we organise
childrearing. In his analysis of dependency as a ground for moral obligation, Goodin
argues that it is not dependency as such9 but the risk of abusing power over the depen-
dent that is intrinsically undesirable. According to him, dependency relationships exhi-
bit a particular combination of features that, together, generate an unacceptably high
risk of abuse: ﬁrst, the relationship is asymmetrical in terms of parties’ power over
each other; second, the dependent party has a vital need for the resources provided by
the other party; third, the superordinate party exercises discretionary control over
those resources; and, ﬁnally, the relationship in question is the only source of such
resources for the dependent party.10 The monopoly generated by the combination of
these features is morally unacceptable. Goodin identiﬁes exploitation as the speciﬁc
problem of monopolies of power. In applying his criticism to parenting, I do not take
a position on the question of whether parental monopolies of power are exploitative.11
If relationships are morally unacceptable when they display certain features, then chil-
drearing arrangements that exhibit these features are illegitimate (unless such degree
of dependency was necessary for advancing children’s interest – which, I shall argue, it
is not).
Parenting as we know it – that is, the status quo as well as parental rights throughout
history and different societies – exhibits all these features. And yet, only the ﬁrst three
must apply to all forms of childrearing. Firstly, children have a vital need for care.
Secondly, asymmetry of power in the parent-child relationship is desirable because
without it adequate care for children may be impossible. If children had the same level
of power as the people who care for them they could resist receiving the care that they
need. Therefore, asymmetry of power between children and their parents is legitimate.
Thirdly, some discretionary control of the parent over the child characterises par-
ent-child relationships as we know them. This feature may be necessary in order to
preserve the intimate nature of parent-child relationship which is valuable to both par-
ent and child: if all the interaction between parent and child was conducted according
to public rules meant to protect the child’s interests, parents’ own needs and desires
could never ﬁnd expression in the relationship.12 This, in turn renders legitimacy to
some parental discretion in their use of power in relationship to the child. In addition,
a certain degree of discretionary use of the power that child-rearers have over children
cannot be eliminated as long as children are raised by human beings, whose needs
and desires are also at stake in the relationship with children, rather than robots.13
Because it would be undesirable to have children raised by robots (for reasons that go
beyond children’s need for intimacy), it would be undesirable to strive to eliminate all
discretion from childrearing. It is true that in many contemporary societies there are
policies and institutions dedicated to the protection of children which limit the discre-
tionary use of parental power. Their main function however is to prevent, detect and
put an end to parental neglect and abuse. They are safeguards only against the very
worst forms of abuse and they are highly fallible safeguards. Moreover, child protec-
tion policies try to mitigate the worst consequences of power abuse but cannot, nor
should they, fully eliminate the discretionary control feature and, with them, various
failings of care.14 Even if childrearing was more strictly regulated, child-rearers would
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have to decide on numerous details about how to do things with and for them, deci-
sions in which children, for good reason, have no authoritative say.
The monopoly of care over children is neither unavoidable nor desirable. Rather, it
is a consequence of giving parents the power to exclude other adults from forming
and maintaining caring relationships with the child. In some countries, parents are
permitted to be the only source of regular and reliable care for their children. This is
the case in countries where there is no compulsory attendance at care-giving or educa-
tional institutions: that is, everywhere for very young (pre-school) children, and wher-
ever home-schooling is legal. In other countries, legislation limits the parental right to
exclude all others from the child – but only after the child reaches school age and is
required to enrol in (some kind of) school. Even in these cases, parents typically can
exercise control over who are the individual people who provide the child with care.
In countries where school attendance is compulsory, parents can choose schools or,
under the more restrictive legislation, avoid particular schools by moving house. More-
over, parents can and often do control their children’s caring relationships with others.
A parent has the last say with respect to which people associate with their children,
and their legal right to exclude particular others does not depend on how these associ-
ations beneﬁt the child. For instance, a parent has the legal right not only to ﬁre a
long-standing, caring nanny, but also prevent her – if the parent so wishes – from con-
tinuing to see the child and cultivate their relationship. The same applies to parental
control over caring relationships with friends, neighbours and members of the
extended family.15 Now, it is true that most children have two parents, rather than
one, and this can mitigate, to some extent, the monopoly of care.16 However, many
caveats apply. First, signiﬁcant numbers of children are raised by single parents. Sec-
ond, even in legally intact families some children in fact receive hand-on care mainly
or only from one parent. Third, cohabiting parents who raise children together display,
at least in theory, a unity of interest that make them, as a couple, hold the monopoly
of care over the child. Children cannot exit, even temporarily, the relationship with
one parent in order to seek better care from the other – at least as long as parents
function as a unitary parenting couple. Co-parents may and do sometimes correct
each other’s mistakes in the relationship with their children; but they can also be – in
virtue of their unity of interest – more likely than other individuals to enable or at least
protect each other’s shortcomings as caregivers. To sum up, existing childrearing prac-
tices display a monopoly of care.
Goodin indicates two strategies for addressing morally objectionable forms of
dependency. One is to ensure that parties can, if necessary, defend themselves against
each other. This is possible only when one of the ﬁrst two features can cease to apply
– that is, when basic needs are no longer involved or the relationship can become sym-
metrical – such that each side can either withdraw or else ‘give as good as it gets in
any ﬁght’. This clearly cannot be the case with parents and children. The other strat-
egy is ‘to try to forestall the threat of exploitation rather than merely trying to defend
against it’ by ‘depriving superordinates of discretion in the disposition of needed
resources. That is by far the best way to deprive dependencies of their moral sting’.17
What should be dismantled in order to render children’s relationships with those who
give them care morally acceptable is the monopoly feature, since ‘as long as the subor-
dinate party can withdraw without severe cost, the superordinate cannot exploit
him’.18 As long as they depend exclusively on the care of their parents – or any other
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unique provider – children cannot withdraw without paying exceedingly high costs.
Even when they have several adults to whom they can reliably turn to for care, chil-
dren need not be able to fully exit the relationship with their own parents (and, espe-
cially young children, are unlikely to wish to do so.) But they would nevertheless gain
the possibility of temporary exit: when signiﬁcant breakdowns of care occur in a rela-
tionship, even when such breakdowns do not amount to serious abuse or neglect, the
child has a fall-back option in place. Therefore, the presence, in the life of the child,
of several caring adults who are independent from each other and who can both sup-
port and supervise each other, would make children’s dependence on their adult care-
givers less objectionable.19
There are several ways in which we can think about particular policies that would
create non-monopolistic ways of providing care for children. Because the monopoly of
care and power that parents have over children is protected by parents’ legal right to
exclude others from the child, this particular legal right has to go. This entails strip-
ping parents of their right to control children’s association with other adults who can
and do provide care for the child. But this measure would not, in itself, ensure that all
children could rely on sources of care additional and alternative to parental care.
Goodin’s account supports the more demanding conclusion that we ought to ensure
that all children are engaged in caring, long-lasting and secure relationships with more
than one adult or group of adults belonging to the same family.
The parental monopoly of care could only be vindicated if it was necessary for the
optimal protection of children’s interests. This, I assume, is implausible. The most
extreme failings of care – abuse and neglect – are easier to discover when children
receive some continuous care from other adults than their parents, especially if these
adults are trained professionals and the interaction takes place in a public setting. It is
possible, and desirable, to educate parents in order to reduce current levels of abuse
and neglect. In an ideal world, they would be entirely eradicated. But my argument,
like Goodin’s, is premised on the assumption that people will always be fallible with
respect to abusing their power – no matter how well-trained – and that, in order to
protect the vulnerable, we ought to put in place mechanisms that prevent or mitigate
such failures. Mandatory attendance of adequate institutional care is such a mecha-
nism, one that signiﬁcantly advantages the worst-off children.
Further, children are likely to beneﬁt more generally from having long-term caring
relationships with adults other then their parents. Not only can they draw on richer
caring resources but, plausibly, exposure to different caregivers can help correct the
effects of more minor failings of care20 and increases the chances that all children have
at least one competent caring adult in their lives. Empirical research conﬁrms that fre-
quent and stable interaction with caring non-parental adults is beneﬁcial in terms of
children’s behaviour and general resilience.21 In particular, we know that attendance
of good quality day-care is beneﬁcial for children over age one.22 Finally, having long-
term caring relationships with several adults increases a child’s chances to be cared for
by someone who loves the child.23 And if the non-parental care is provided by trained
individuals on public settings it can signiﬁcantly increase children’s access to other
special goods of childhood (as I discuss in the next section.)
The best way to ensure that all children are engaged in multiple caring relationships
is therefore to require all children above one to regularly attend good quality caregiv-
ing institutions such as day-care and kindergarten and to ensure that schools provide
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care – by employing social workers who must make themselves available to children
for emergencies – as well as academic training. To properly provide children with
enduring caring relationships these institution must employ enough well-trained staff
and ensure low turnover.
My proposal faces two worries.24 First, if children have a moral right to receive care
from more than one adult, then it seems that we collectively are under the duty to
ensure that sufﬁcient adults provide such care. But this duty, especially if it is enforce-
able, seems very demanding. Second, if in order to respect children’s rights we were
to deprive parents from a monopoly of care they may lack sufﬁcient incentive to have
children.
It is true that my views concerning just childrearing are demanding; the ﬁrst pro-
blem is merely an instantiation of the general problem that our duties towards children
are very demanding. For instance, it is likely that orphans have the moral right to an
upbringing as good as that of other children, which requires committed and loving
child-rearers; yet, this is only possible if we are collectively under a duty to provide
such child-rearers to the orphans.25 The duty to provide all children with non-parental
caregivers may be enforceable, at least as long as there are legitimate ways of enforcing
it. For instance, it may be possible to nudge sufﬁcient people, through ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial incentives, to work as non-parental caregivers. This, again, seems to be
the same problem – albeit on a different scale – as ensuring, non-coercively, that
adults work as caregivers when some children become orphans.
The over-demandingness worry is somewhat alleviated by the fact that we have – or,
at least, can achieve – control over the number of children who come into existence.
Which prompts the related worry that my suggested practice of childrearing could dis-
suade people from having children. This worry may or may not be warranted, but it is
not a good reason to resist my proposal. Surely, people’s unwillingness to procreate or
parent under certain conditions cannot show that children do not have the moral
rights which, if enforced, would disincentivise their being brought into existence. Peo-
ple may have become less willing to have children when they were forbidden to
require their minor children to work for a wage or to apply corporeal punishments to
children. But these surely could not be (even weak) reasons to think that children do
not have moral rights to be free from corporal punishment or waged labour; nor were
they reasons not to implement the respective reforms.
This analysis of children’s vulnerability would apply equally to any group of individ-
uals who are dependent on other people’s care, who cannot voluntarily exit all caring
relationships and whose caring relationships will either unavoidably or desirably con-
tain some degree of discretion (for instance, adults whose mental impairments make
them subject to legitimate paternalism). In the next section I turn to a second way in
which children are vulnerable, which is unique to them.
The Goods of Childhood and the Content of Legitimate Authority Over
Children
Children depend on adults in order to enjoy what they are entitled to by justice;
adults’ authority over children can be legitimately exercised only if the adults in ques-
tion provide children with what is owed to them. As Colin Macleod and Lars
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Lindbolm have argued, standard theories about the metric of justice – that is, about
the things the distribution of which is a matter of justice – do not work well in the case
of children, to whom it is improper to ascribe full moral responsibility.26 It is likely
that, instead of resources, or opportunities for wellbeing, or capabilities, we owe chil-
dren those goods that will make their lives go well while children and as future adults.
In this case, perfectionism in childrearing need not be a problem.27
The difﬁcult questions concerning the metric of justice for children, then, are which
goods contribute to a good childhood, which goods contribute to a ﬂourishing adult-
hood and how to weight them against each other when necessary trade-offs have to be
made between these two categories of goods.
Recent developments in thinking about the nature and value of childhood help with
these questions. Several philosophers have been drawing attention to the fact that
childhood is not mere preparation for adult life;28 rather, they think that children can
enjoy a number of ‘special goods of childhood’, understood as goods that are valuable
whether or not they contribute to children’s development. In particular, Macleod has
argued that we owe children those goods that make their childhoods go well.29 I
defended the view that children have privileged but non-exclusive access to a number
of such goods and this can make children’s lives go better, in some important respects,
than adults’ lives.30 The special goods of childhood of interest here are the experienc-
ing of caring affection from adults whom the children can trust and love wholeheart-
edly and unstructured time during which children engage in fantasy play,
experimentation and undirected exploration of the world and of their minds. The
enjoyment of both kinds of goods is made possible by some of the features of child-
hood that create children’s general vulnerability analysed in the previous section: that
is, their pervasive dependency on adults. Without it, neither the quality of the intimate
relationship between children and caregivers nor children’s necessary leisure time
would exist.
This view is not uncontested. Some believe children’s dependency on adult care
and their being subject to justiﬁed paternalism mean that childhood as such is, all
things considered, bad for children.31 If so, then we should help children overcome
this state as soon as possible. According to Sarah Hannan, childhood is an intrinsically
undesirable state because children necessarily suffer from various bads,32 some of
which coincide with the facts that make monopolies of care over children problematic:
they are unable to meet their needs and are subject to legitimate domination in almost
every area of life,33 they are relatively small and weak, bad at means-ends reasoning
and prone to form incautious attachments (these last features make their exit from
relationships difﬁcult and costly.) Other bads to which children are subject, as men-
tioned by Hannan and others, concern their lack of full moral agency: children do not
have a ﬁxed practical identity, a ‘self of their own’. This, of course, might be the very
reason why authority can be legitimately exercised over them34 – the reason why we
would not want to do away with all childrearing, even if it raises the above-discussed
worries of illegitimate use of power. If the picture of childhood as involving distinctive
bads were both true and complete, it would support the belief that legitimate authority
over children must be exercised in order to help children leave childhood behind, the
sooner the better.
I will argue to the contrary. First, this picture of childhood – while possibly wide-
spread – is incomplete and hence not entirely correct. It underestimates those valuable
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abilities that children possess to a higher extent than average adults. Indeed, these
abilities are so important that we value them very highly in both children and adults
and we value them even when they do not lead to remarkable accomplishments. The
exercise of these abilities constitutes some of the central goods of childhood, necessary
for the full ﬂourishing of children. It is crucial to see that the existence of these abili-
ties in children is made possible, at least in part, by some features which also generate
childhood bads. In this sense, many of the goods and bads of childhood are two faces
of the same coin.
This issue is important both for understanding children’s speciﬁc vulnerability and
for reaching conclusions about the content of legitimate authority over children. If
childhood were bad for individuals in ways that are not mitigated by signiﬁcant goods
of childhood, it would be fair to conclude that being in the state of childhood is, other
things equal, making the individual worse off. We usually think that being vulnerable
and being the worse off come in the same package: vulnerability makes people worse
off, and being amongst the worse off usually makes one more vulnerable. Yet, I am
saying here that children have privileged access to some very important goods. For this
reason, childhood is likely to be a period when our lives can go better, in some
respects and possibly overall, than they can go during adulthood. Where does this
leave us with respect to thinking about children’s vulnerability? Is it possible to con-
tinue seeing children as the most vulnerable members of society, and hence in need of
special protection, while at the same time believing that, as such, children’s lives go
well in unique ways – that, indeed, childhood may be one of your best times? I will
address this issue after having clariﬁed the childhood goods at stake.
Over the past three decades, several distinct bodies of literature started to challenge
the conventional image of children as being mere ‘unﬁnished adults’.35 This literature
comes from philosophy with children, neuroscience, developmental psychology and
even art history. According to several scholars working in these ﬁelds, children pos-
sess, to a much higher degree than usually acknowledged, and to a higher degree than
average adults, certain epistemic abilities as well as artistic and philosophical abilities.
Results from developmental psychology as reported by Alison Gopnik indicate that
even quite young children are in fact very good at theoretical reasoning – within the
purview of their limited experience of the world. Looking at children’s early learning,
Gopnik and others came to the conclusion that children’s uniquely fast learning is in
part explained by their ability to form hypotheses and then test them in light of experi-
ence.36 On this account, toddlers and even babies ‘think, draw conclusions, make pre-
dictions, look for explanations, and even do experiments’.37 To use Gopnik and her
co-authors’ own catchy metaphor, they are ‘scientists in the crib’. Beyond the crib, we
know that older children’s unusual scientiﬁc creativity enables them to occasionally
make scientiﬁc breakthroughs even in times of highly specialised knowledge-
production.38
In a similar vein, Gareth Matthews criticised Jean Piaget’s standard theory of chil-
dren’s cognitive development for assuming rather than proving children’s imperfect
rationality.39 One of Matthews’ charges to Piaget is that the latter failed to understand
children’s questions as philosophical questions. But Matthews’, and other philoso-
phers’, experience, is that children – at least pre-puberty – are more capable of asking
deep, competent philosophical questions, than adults who do not go on to be profes-
sional philosophers. This is because children are more curious, less conventional in
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their thinking, and more imaginative, making it possible to dream up alternative
worlds. Matthews’ critics have objected that children’s philosophical pursuits do not
display the same range of values that makes for good philosophy – such as systematic-
ity, and tenacious engagement with an issue and the ability to see one’s reasoning to
its last conclusions.40 However, this can be granted – and, with it, the conclusion that
children are not particularly good at philosophical accomplishments – without denying
that they posses the uniquely philosophical ability of asking the right question.
Not only Matthews but also art historians41 and artists themselves (for instance,
Pablo Picasso) attribute to children artistic abilities that are, on average, superior to
those of adults. The claim here is that children are, in general, better able to produce
aesthetically worthwhile drawings than adults who are not professional artists. It is an
open question whether adults could (be educated to) retain children’s superior abili-
ties. Even if they could to some degree, age-speciﬁc neurological development may
limit the retention of these abilities (as I explain below). Moreover, the unavoidable
responsibilities of adult life – including the responsibility to care for the next genera-
tion – will probably always limit adults’ opportunities to exercise these abilities to the
extent to which they can retrain them.42
To sum up, although children on average rarely come up with compelling scientiﬁc
or philosophical answers, let alone theories, and rarely create works of art that are con-
sidered of highest merit, they are, in comparison to the average adult, more philosophi-
cally – and scientiﬁcally-minded and artistically creative. In Matthew’s words:
For many people the art or philosophy of their childhood is never equaled,
let alone surpassed, by the art or philosophy of their adult lives. If painting or
doing philosophy has any non-instrumental value for them, it is their child art
and their child philosophy that have such value.43
Neuoscience explains this discrepancy between children’s and adults’ abilities by the
fact that, in children, the prefrontal cortex is not fully developed, leading to a lower
ability to inhibit information and to focus on particular tasks. The disadvantage, for
children, is that they have much lower executive abilities than adults; yet, the same
neurophysiological feature makes them more open to new experience, curious and cre-
ative. Gopnik writes that ‘[t]o be imaginative, you want to consider as many possibili-
ties as you can, even wild and unprecedented ones . . . In learning, you want to remain
open to anything that may turn out to be the truth.’44 This seems an overstatement,
since the process of learning involves eliminating some possible answers in favour
others,45 yet this does not distract from the point that children’s openness is conduc-
tive to distinctive and valuable learning abilities.
If this account of childhood is correct, then it is not true that children are as bad at
ends-means reasoning as they have been traditionally believed to be. Rather than a
lack of rationality as such, it is their very limited experience of the world in combina-
tion with their lack of emotional self-control that justiﬁes the view that children are
insufﬁciently competent decision-makers and that they are subject to legitimate pater-
nalism. Further, this account shows that children who exercise the creative abilities
outlined above have privileged access to some goods that we consider highly valuable
– in children, as well as in adults’ lives: philosophical, scientiﬁc and artistic pursuits.
Most of us think such pursuits are very valuable whether or not they lead to corre-
sponding accomplishments – indeed, that they are important enough to make lives
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that contain them good, in some important respects, on an objective understanding of
wellbeing. Interestingly, the goods of childhood discussed here seem to be made possi-
ble by the very factors that generate the bads of childhood outlined by Hannan: chil-
dren’s neurological immaturity, in combination with legitimate adult authority over
them, meant to protect them from the disastrous consequences of this immaturity.
But children’s lack of control over their lives at the same time relieves them of much
of adult responsibility, thus freeing their time and attention for creative pursuits which
adults do not, and cannot, have the same leisure to enjoy.46
Finally, children’s lack of a stable self is often taken to be a source of childhood
bads, because it, too, legitimises paternalistic behaviour towards children. Christine
Straehle identiﬁes this as the source of children’s vulnerability.47 Yet, the same fact is
likely to generate one of childhood’s special goods: the ability to experiment with dif-
ferent selves – experimentation which, plausibly, has intrinsic as well as instrumental
value.48
Children, then, have privileged access to goods that make their lives go particularly
well in some respects. The above discussion of the goods and bads of childhood is
compatible with several positions and I do not, in this article, commit to any in partic-
ular: maybe the bads and goods of childhood balance each other out, such that chil-
dren are not, qua children, either better or worse off than adults. Or maybe children
are, qua children, either better off than adults or – as Hannan thinks – worse off. I
believe that the following analysis of the children’s moral right to the special goods of
childhood does not hinge on a particular conclusion on this matter. The reason is that,
even if the special goods of childhood are not valuable enough to make up for the bads
of childhood, some of them have high developmental value: Gopnik and her co-
authors believe that children’s experimental play is the basis for their future ability to
innovate. More generally, the importance of unstructured play for healthy develop-
ment is sufﬁciently uncontroversial for paediatricians to issue guidelines meant to pro-
tect it.49 There is similar consensus concerning the importance of children’s
experiencing trusting and loving relationships with adults who provide care to the chil-
dren.50 Therefore, the quality of one’s life qua future adult depends on the enjoyment
of these goods during childhood. Trying to artiﬁcially speed up children’s develop-
ment would, in this case, backﬁre.51
Children’s adequate access to such goods depends on many factors that are outside
their control: most importantly, on being given sufﬁcient time unburdened by speciﬁc
demands, when they can explore and experiment freely. They also depend on adults
ready to encourage their scientiﬁc curiosity and artistic creativity and to discuss philos-
ophy with them. (For instance, the emerging ﬁeld of doing philosophy with children
suggests that children tend to be unusually curious, imaginative and ready to ask fun-
damental questions but also lack the experience and grit necessary to enjoy good
philosophical explorations; therefore they greatly beneﬁt from competent adult
guidance.) And children depend on adults for access to the material basis of these
pursuits.
Because, unlike adults, they are not in control of their time, social interactions and
of material resources, children are at the mercy of adults for the enjoyment of these
goods. Take, for instance, the example of pretend play that allows one to exercise
one’s artistic imagination and have fun. This good, I assume, is available to both chil-
dren and adults although adults may have a harder time accessing it. Adults can and
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do decide, at will, to engage in pretend play: for example, they can decide to re-enact
a day in the Second World War – as it sometimes happens in England – with relatively
modest resources: their free time on a weekend and a couple of funny hats and hand-
me-down clothes. By contrast, children need adults’ permission to play in an unstruc-
tured way (rather than study or exercise), to play with playmates (rather than alone),
to play in particular ways (even when these are disruptive of adults’ comfort), and to
use whatever materials they need. Parents themselves may have the will to provide
children with the necessary basis needed to exercise children’s abilities, yet lack the
necessary resources: they may be excessively busy making ends meet (and hence lack
the time to supervise them or engage in exploratory conversations), or lack the neces-
sary education, or have little choice but to live in urban environments lacking in public
spaces where children can play together. Or they may have enough time, education
and infrastructure to provide for their children, but assume – correctly or not – that,
in order to achieve success in overly competitive social circumstances their children
must be trained, as early as possible, in the skills that will enable them to be ahead of
their competitors: ﬁrst in educational, and later in working, environments.52 These
skills may, but do not necessarily have to, coincide with the skills that children develop
while discovering the world, playing, drawing, dancing and asking metaphysical ques-
tions. If a parent raises a child in an overly competitive environment in which all other
children are expected to show early academic achievements, it may be rational for that
parent to deprive her child of the special goods of childhood. This is especially true if
admission to particular schools (or pre-schools!) depends on such achievements.
This last point suggests that making the goods of childhood generally available is a
collective problem that affects even parents who wish to, and can, provide their chil-
dren the special goods of childhood. Each parent may be right to think that, as long as
other parents’ children spend increasing amounts of their time in training for future
competition, it is too risky to give one’s child too much unstructured play. Yet, all
parents may have reason to wish that enough of their child’s time is protected from
goal-oriented activities which are allegedly making them more competitive. If so, then
the only way of ensuring that all children enjoy unstructured time is to partly socialise
their rearing in institutions that provide them with enough such time. Universal atten-
dance at good institutions can undermine to some extent the rat-race of making one’s
child as competitive as early as possible, partly by diminishing parental inﬂuence over
their children.
There are other reasons why the special goods of childhood are best provided in
communal contexts. First, not all children have easy access to enough other children
in their private homes. Perhaps children playing on their own can realise some of the
good of imaginative play, but, I assume, playing with other children and engaging in
friendships with children is part and parcel of a good childhood.53 Second, because
the special goods of childhood are also more likely to be available to children if they
beneﬁt from long-term engagement with adults who are themselves interested in, and
knowledgeable about, science, the arts and philosophy. Third, compared to other
forms of non-parental care, well-run childcare institutions are more likely to distribute
more equally children’s access to at least one loving and trustworthy adult.
Therefore, there is a common way to address the two kinds of children’s
vulnerability. Because children are vulnerable to their caregivers, justice requires that
we avoid monopolies of care and ensure that all children have robust access to some
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non-parental long-lasting caring relationships. Partial, mandatory attendance of day-
care centres, kindergartens and schools54 is the best way to meet this demand. More-
over, it is also the best way to provide all children with the special goods of childhood
that are owed to them.
The discussion about children’s vulnerability usually refers to the ways in which
being a child makes one, at least potentially, worse off.55 And yet, I suggest, childhood
is also a source of advantage because children have privileged access to important
goods. This may raise a worry: assuming that the special goods of childhood make
children’s lives go better than adults’ lives, how can children be entitled to them by
justice?
Here it is worth distinguishing between two sources of vulnerability. One can be
especially vulnerable because one is at higher risk than others of not enjoying an
important good that everybody is capable of enjoying equally: a junior person in many
companies is more vulnerable than more senior persons to losing her job. Alterna-
tively, one can be especially vulnerable to the loss of a good that only some can enjoy:
a talented and passionate pianist is more vulnerable then others to the evils of rheuma-
tism. The second kind of vulnerability can only affect those who are, in some sense,
better off.
Children are vulnerable in both ways, and both kinds of vulnerability generate
weighty claims to protection. The ﬁrst kind, the one typically discussed in relation to
children, is quite straightforwardly a matter of justice. But additional explanation is
required to see why the second kind of vulnerability generates a claim of justice. In
the case of the pianist there are consequentialist reasons (like excellence and utility) to
protect her exceptional ability. These are not, at least not obviously, reasons of justice.
The pianist is very lucky, in the ﬁrst instance, to have her wonderful and unusual abil-
ity; she is, in this respect, more advantaged then the rest of us. It would be unfair to
give priority to the protection of her abilities when faced with claims to protection
from people who are worse off to start with. The case of children may be thought to
be similar, if they enjoy wonderful abilities that are unusual in adults and that make
their lives go better in some important respects than the lives of adults. I think there
are some good answers to this challenge.
In certain respects the case of children is indeed similar to that of the talented pia-
nist. The goods that children enjoy if they can fully exercise their epistemic and cre-
ative abilities merit protection on account of being forms of human excellence as well
as for reasons of efﬁciency, or utility: The full exercise of these capacities is likely to
bring joy to children and the adults in their lives. But children’s possession of special
abilities is also disanalogous with the case of the pianist because we all start life as
children but we do not all have the privilege of possessing, at some point in our lives,
excellent musical abilities. Thus, reasons of efﬁciency for giving special protection to
children’s enjoyment of the childhood goods discussed here are also likely to be rea-
sons of justice: The enjoyment of these goods contributes to a good childhood and
has signiﬁcant developmental value. Moreover, most individuals who have lost their
chance to enjoy the special goods of childhood as children have missed their only
chance to enjoy them at their best. Hence, our lives go better overall if we enable
access to them during childhood. And at least some philosophers will agree that a Par-
eto optimal equal distribution (according to whatever principle of equality one sub-
scribes to) is more just than a Pareto inferior equal distribution. Justice may prohibit
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy
Children’s Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority Over Children 71
levelling down when there is no gain in equality for doing so. According to the lifetime
perspective on justice – a controversial yet dominant view – justice requires some kind
of equality between individuals over the entire course of their lives. Therefore, if the
lifetime perspective on justice is correct, one need not worry that providing children
with the goods of childhood is unfair even if it really results in children being better
off than adults.
Conclusions
Children are vulnerable in several ways, both of which bear on the issue of just chil-
drearing. Most of us agree that authority can be legitimately exercised over children,
for their own good. Yet, the exercise of authority over another individual puts her at a
signiﬁcant risk that power over her will be abused. Indeed, most literature on justice
in childrearing focuses on this very obvious and general kind of vulnerability in chil-
dren. The usual conclusion drawn by philosophers is that parents are the main holders
of legitimate authority over their children, and that limits of this authority must be rig-
orously deﬁned and monitored with a view to advancing children’s interests. Without
denying this, I suggest a more radical restructuring of authority over children: to be
legitimate, it must avoid monopolies of power in ways that I have sketched in the sec-
ond section above.
But this does not say much about how authority over children ought to be exercised:
children’s access to which goods must be ensured by those who have authority over
them? Undeniably, children have claims to goods such as food, safety, shelter, cloth-
ing, some emotional nurturing and education. Yet, as the recent discussion of the spe-
cial goods of childhood suggests, there may be goods that are particularly important to
children and which are not on this list. Some of them are more likely to have develop-
mental value than others. I have argued that the existence of these goods partly deter-
mines the content of legitimate authority over children: those who control children’s
lives must provide children with robust access to them.
The discussion on both the structure and the content of legitimate authority over
children led to the conclusion that justice in childrearing requires the establishment of
institutions which provide children with the goods they are being owed and the revi-
sion of parental rights to ensure that parents cannot prevent their children from
attending these institutions. In the ﬁrst claim, I join my voice to the view already
advanced by Macleod that schools ought, as a matter of justice, to provide children
with play and artistic activities.
A ﬁnal conclusion is that two opposed views on the question of the distinctive good-
ness and badness of childhood can both acknowledge that children are particularly
vulnerable, yet yield different conclusions on how badly or well off children are in vir-
tue of being children. The special goods of childhood may outweigh its bads, in which
case rushing children through childhood would be objectionable because it would
deprive them from proper enjoyment of these goods. Or the bads of childhood may
outweigh its special goods, in which case we would be wrong to rush children though
childhood because these goods have signiﬁcant developmental value. It is fortunate
that the debate on whether childhood is, as such, a desirable or undesirable state need
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not bear too heavily on the practically more important debate concerning children’s
entitlements of justice.56
Anca Gheaus, Department of Law, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Merce Roderoda Building,
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